Blog Schmog
I think to imagine that P is impossible is to imagine a being experiencing frustration trying to bring P about. I would like to give an anti-realist account of modality in terms of this, but I think analogs to Crispin Wright’s ("Truth and Objectivity") argument that coincident normative force (his example, P’s truth and P’s […]
(1) BELIEFS are the primary way we represent the world to ourselves, // (2) knowledge is something like justified, true, BELIEF (plus maybe some fourth condition added), // (3) the propositional content of a BELIEF is determined by whatever it is in the world that makes the belief true or false, // (4) a BELIEF […]
1) necessity and possibility are best explained in terms of our interactions with the world, but (contra Blackburn) should be spelled out along Kantian rather than Humean lines, (2) the computational metaphor for human thinking is mistaken, (3) one of the proper upshots of the later Wittgenstein is that agreement on meaning is not based […]