1) necessity and possibility are best explained in terms of our interactions with the world, but (contra Blackburn) should be spelled out along Kantian rather than Humean lines, (2) the computational metaphor for human thinking is mistaken, (3) one of the proper upshots of the later Wittgenstein is that agreement on meaning is not based or grounded in anything other than our agreement to agree (and thus that the vast majority of extant theories of concepts and word meaning suffer from the naturalistic fallacy), and (4) beauty and the sublime are two of the most important aesthteic, psychological, and ethical categories (and that aesthetic theories should mainly be about such aesthetic properties, and not about answering the demarcation problem about art), (5) belief is an impediment to faith, (6) Heideggerian anti-representationalism is correct, (7) about spiritual matters, either Plato or Schopenhauer is correct, (8) John McDowell’s neo-Hegelianism might be correct (it provides probably the only satisfying answer to naturalistic fallacy worries that arise out of the Kripke Wittgenstein rule following paradox and Davidsonian concerns about charity), (9) as cool as all things Sellars are, reliabilist epistemology shows the "myth of the given" argument to utilize a false dichotomy, (10) Quine’s criteria of ontological commitment ("to be is to be the value of a bound variable") is complete crap; formal frameworks do not carry their metaphysical commitments on their sleeves, but rather philosophical interpretations of those frameworks do.
Of these, I’ve written most directly about (2) up to this point. Mark Silcox and I are going to finish our book about this issue this year. Part of he book will function a little bit as a prolegomena to a book I hope to write about (1) in the next six years. As far as (4), Mark and I will about the demarcation problem in aesthetics this year, and I hope to write about sublime maybe a decade from now. (3) is very hard to write a good academic paper about because it becomes too metaphilosopical. I’m hoping that Mark and my paper gets into to this a bit, and also to get a paper on Richard Rorty done this academic year that discusses it. I will write a book about (7) when I am retired. (8) and (9) I don’t know. I want to look for a Sellarsian critique of reliabilism (addressing 9) as a way to think about 8. 10 is too methodological to write an easy paper about, and too many current metaphysicians have staked their life’s work on it.
Why Kantian rather than Humean?
I really only know cartoon versions of Hume, and everyone I know that reads lots of Hume assures me that his views are much more sophisticated. By the cartoon version, Hume had an associationist model of cognition by which he could not make sense of necessary connections between the things associated.
I think that we have an experience of frustration when we attempt to bring something about and can’t which has its own unique phenomenological feel. With Hume I don’t think that it can be reduced to something respectable by associationist lights. Against Hume I don’t think it needs to be. If this is so, then we have an experience of impossibility, or things being necessarily not the case (e.g. it is necessarily not the case that I can jump higher than four feet). So that’s the first departure from Hume.
Then I think “objective” necessity and possiblity are attained by projection. To imagine that something is necessarily the case is to imagine that any being, no matter how much more powerful than us, would experience frustration trying to stop the relevant state of affairs. So in this sense, necessity is projected. But again, on my cartoon version of Hume, this is to render necessity in some sense fictional. I’m happy to say that there are facts of the matter about the experiences of mythical god like creatures.
I realize this is a goofy view, but there you have it. The next question is, “why think this view is Kantian?”